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21.1 Cosmological Model Inference with Finite Data
In physical cosmology we are faced with an empirical context of gradually
diminishing returns from new observations. This is true in a fundamental
sense, since the amount of information we can expect to collect through as-
tronomical observations is finite, owing to the fact that we occupy a particu-
lar vantage point in the history and spatial extent of the Universe. Arguably,
we may approach the observational limit in the foreseeable future, at least
in relation to some scientific hypotheses (Ellis, 2014). There is no guaran-
tee that the amount and types of information we are able to collect will be
sufficient to statistically test all reasonable hypotheses that may be posed.
There is under-determination both in principle and in practice (Zinkernagel,
2011; Butterfield, 2014; Ellis, 2014). These circumstances are not new, in-
deed cosmology has had to contend with this problem throughout history.
For example, Whitrow (1949) relates the same concerns, and points back to
remarks by Blaise Pascal in the 17th century: “But if our view be arrested
there let our imagination pass beyond; ... We may enlarge our conceptions
beyond all imaginable space; we only produce atoms in comparison with the
reality of things.” Already with Thales, epistemological principles of unifor-
mity and consistency have been used to structure the locally imaginable into
something considered globally plausible. The primary example in contem-
porary cosmology is the Cosmological Principle of large-scale isotropy and
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homogeneity. In the following, the aim will be to apply principles of uni-
formity and consistency to the procedure of cosmological model inference
itself.
The state of affairs described above naturally leads to a view of model in-
ference as inference to the best explanation/model (e.g. Maher, 1993; Lipton,
2004), since some degree of explanatory ambiguity appears unavoidable in
principle. This is consistent with a Bayesian interpretation of probability
which includes a priori assumptions explicitly. As in science generally, in-
ference in cosmology is based on statistical testing of models in light of
empirical data. A large body of literature has built up in recent years dis-
cussing various aspects of these methods, with Bayesian statistics becoming
a standard framework (Jaynes, 2003; Hobson, 2010; von Toussaint, 2011).
The necessary foundations of Bayesian inference will be presented in the
next section.
Turning to the current observational and theoretical status of cosmology,
a fundamental understanding of the dark energy phenomenon is largely lack-
ing. Hence we would like to collect more data. Yet all data collected so far
point consistently to the simplest model of a cosmological constant, which
is not well-understood in any fundamental sense. Many of the other theoret-
ical models of dark energy are also such that they may be observationally
indistinguishable from a cosmological constant (Efstathiou, 2008). Another
important area is empirical tests of the inflationary paradigm, the lead-
ing explanation of the initial conditions for structure in the Universe (e.g.
Smeenk, 2014). Testing such models necessitates, in principle, the specifi-
cation or derivation of an a priori probability of inflation occurring (with
particular duration and other relevant properties). The measure problem is
the question of how this specification is to be made, and will be the departure
point and central concern in the following sections.
We will argue that the measure problem, and hence model inference, is
ill defined due to ambiguity in the concepts of probability, global proper-
ties, and explanation, in the situation where additional empirical observa-
tions cannot add any significant new information about some relevant global
property. We then turn to the question of how model inference can be be
made conceptually well-defined in this context, by extending the concept
of probability to general valuations (under a few basic restrictions) on par-
tially ordered sets known as lattices. On this basis, an extended axiological
Bayesianism for model inference is then outlined. The main purpose here is
to propose a well-motivated, systematic formalisation of the various model
assessments routinely, but informally, performed by practising scientists.
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21.2 Bayesian Inference
Inference can be performed on different levels. An important distinction is
that between parameter and model inference: the first assumes that a partic-
ular model is true and derives the most likely model parameter values on the
basis of observations, whereas the latter compares the relative probability
that different models are true on the basis of observations. The two inferen-
tial procedures can be regarded as corresponding epistemically to description
(parameter inference) and explanation (model inference) respectively. This
chapter will focus on model inference, which becomes particularly trouble-
some in the global cosmological context. We present both cases below for
completeness. For more on Bayesian inference, see e.g. Jaynes (2003).
21.2.1 Parameter Inference
Bayesian parameter inference is performed by computing the posterior prob-
ability
p(θ|D;M) =
L(D|θ;M)Π(θ;M)
P (D;M)
, (21.1)
where D is some collection of data, M the model under consideration, and θ
the model parameters. The likelihood of the data is given by L(D|θ;M) and
the prior probability distribution is Π(θ;M). The normalisation constant
P (D;M) is irrelevant for parameter inference, but central to model infer-
ence, and will be discussed next. The expression above is known as Bayes’
theorem.
21.2.2 Model Inference
The Bayesian evidence for a model M given data D can be written
P (D;M) =
∫
L(D|θ;M)Π(θ;M)dθ , (21.2)
where symbols are defined as above. The Bayesian evidence is also called the
marginalised likelihood, reflecting the fact that it measures the average like-
lihood across the prior distribution, and is thus a measure of overall model
goodness in light of data and pre-knowledge. It is used in inference to com-
pare models, with a higher evidence indicating a better model. Conventional
reference scales (e.g. the Jeffreys scale) exist to suggest when a difference in
evidence is large enough to prefer one model over another (Hobson, 2010).
Looking at Eq. (21.2), the Bayesian evidence is clearly sensitive to the
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specification of the prior distribution. A prior is usually specified based on
previous empirical knowledge from parameter estimation, or may be pre-
dicted by the theoretical model, or given by some aesthetic principle. This
highlights two things: without empirical pre-knowledge, a prior is entirely
based on theoretical or philosophical assumption, and a prior is also not
cleanly separable from the model likelihood and can therefore to a degree
be regarded as part of the model. As increasing amounts of data is col-
lected, the influence of the initial prior is gradually diminished through the
process of Bayesian updating, i.e. the current posterior probability becomes
the (new) prior probability for a future data analysis. Through this process,
the posterior eventually converges to a distribution essentially only depen-
dent on the total numbers of and precisions of measurements. Increasingly
numerous and precise measurements make the initial prior insignificant for
the posterior. When data is extremely limited relative to the quantity/model
of interest, this process stops short and the initial prior can then play a sig-
nificant role in the evidence calculation. This will be of importance in the
discussion that follows.
21.3 Global Model Inference in Cosmology
Cosmology, by its nature, seeks to describe and explain the large-scale and
global properties of the Universe. There is also, by the nature of the field,
a problem of finite data and underdetermination that becomes particularly
poignant for measuring and explaining some global properties of the Uni-
verse. This will typically be associated with features on physical scales cor-
responding to the size of the observable Universe or larger, or features in
the very early Universe. On the one hand, there is an epistemological ques-
tion of knowledge based on one observation (i.e. the one realisation of a
universe we can observe): how accurate/representative is our measurement?
On the other hand, there is an ontological question of whether a property
is ‘truly’ global: if not, how might it co-depend on other properties, with
possible implications for the evaluation of probabilities and inference? We
shall therefore distinguish epistemically and ontically global properties in
the following. In general, a global property will be defined here as some
feature of the Universe which remains constant across the relevant domain
(e.g. observable Universe, totality of existence).
A conventional approach to global properties is to treat separate regions
of the Universe as effectively separate universes, such that sampling across
regions in the Universe corresponds to sampling across different realisa-
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tions of a universe. While this approach is useful for understanding the
statistics of our Universe on scales smaller than the observable Universe,
when approaching this scale the uncertainty becomes increasingly large and
eventually dominates. This uncertainty is commonly called cosmic variance
(see e.g. Lyth and Liddle, 2009). We will explicitly only be concerned
with the case when this cosmic variance cannot be further reduced
by additional empirical observations to any significant degree, for
some global property of interest.
A case in point of particular contemporary relevance concerns the initial
conditions of the Universe – what is the statistical distribution of such initial
conditions? This is often described as ‘the probability of the Universe’, or
‘the probability of inflation’ since the inflationary paradigm is the leading
explanation for producing a large, geometrically flat universe and its initial
density fluctuations. More formally, it is known as the measure problem:
what is the probability measure on the space of possible universes (known
as multiverse)? The measure problem is important, because parameter in-
ference might non-negligibly depend on this measure, and model inference
should non-negligibly depend on this measure. Meaningfully performing in-
ference at this level of global properties therefore depends on finding some
resolution for how to approach the measure problem. In recent years, this
has led to intense debate on the scientific status of inflation theory, string
theory, and other multiverse proposals (Carr, 2007; Steinhardt, 2011; Dawid,
2013; Kragh, 2014; Smeenk, 2014; Ellis and Silk, 2014; Dawid, 2015).
This is not the place for addressing the range of approaches to this problem
in the literature. Proposals commonly rely on some relative spatial volume,
aesthetic/theoretical principle (e.g. Jeffreys prior, maximum entropy), or dy-
namical principle (e.g. energy conservation, Liouville measure). The reader
is referred to Carr (2007); Smeenk (2014) and references therein for more
details.
21.4 The Measure Problem: A Critical Analysis
21.4.1 Preliminaries
It is helpful to recognise that the measure problem is a sub-problem, arising
in a particular context, related to the broader question of how to perform
model inference in relation to global properties of the Universe. It arises as
a problem from the desire to provide explanation for some certain global
properties of the Universe, and so depends on a view of what requires ex-
planation and what provides suitable explanation. In pursuing statistical
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explanation, the problem naturally presents itself through the application
of conventional Bayesian statistical inference as we have seen above, and par-
ticularly in the calculation of Bayesian evidence, where the assignment of a
prior probability distribution for parameter values is essential. The model
and/or prior will also explicitly or implicitly describe how different global
properties co-depend, and more generally prescribe some particular struc-
ture for the unobserved ensemble of universes (hence, the multiverse). This
ensemble may or may not correspond to a physically real structure.
In addressing the measure problem, one might therefore explore the im-
plications of varying the conditions, assumptions, and approaches described
above. To what extent is the measure problem a product thereof? We will
considering this question in the following. The analysis echoes issues raised
in e.g. Ellis’ and Aguirre’s contributions in Carr (2007); Ellis (2014); and
Smeenk (2014), while providing a new context and synthesis. In the follow-
ing, Kolmogorov probability will be contrasted with Bayesian probability
for illustration and motivation. We note that other foundations and defini-
tions of probability, which we do not consider, also exist (e.g., de Finetti’s
approach) – see Jaynes (2003).
21.4.2 Analysis
Structure of Global Properties
Statistical analysis for global properties in cosmology typically relies on cer-
tain unspoken assumptions. For example, it is commonly assumed that the
constants of Nature are statistically independent, or that a multiverse can
be meaningfully described by slight variations of the laws of physics as we
know them – for example as in Tegmark et al. (2006). For many practical
purposes, these assumptions are reasonable or irrelevant. However, in some
cosmological contexts, especially in relation to global properties and ques-
tions of typicality/fine-tuning, such assumptions can impact on the con-
clusions drawn from observations. For example, it has been argued that
fine-tuning arguments rely on untestable theoretical assumptions about the
structure of the space of possible universes (Ellis, 2014).
A distinction was made in the preceding Section between epistemically
global and ontically global properties of the Universe. A central point is
that it is impossible to make this distinction purely observationally: the set
of ontically global properties will intersect the set of epistemically global
properties, but which properties belong to this intersection set cannot be
determined observationally. Hence, it is possible that some ontically global
properties remain unknown, and that some epistemically global properties
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are not ontically global. This implies that in general, global properties will
be subject to an uncertainty associated with these sources of epistemic in-
determinacy.
In consequence, when seeking to determine and explain some certain
global properties through analysis of observational data, the possibility that
the values of these global properties could depend on some other global
properties – known or unknown – cannot be excluded empirically. One ex-
ample of this possibility concerns the constants of Nature, whose values may
be interdependent (as also predicted by some theories). Another example is
the distinction between physical (global) law and initial conditions of the
Universe: in what sense are these concepts different? They are both epistem-
ically global properties, and from an epistemological point of view clearly
interdependent to some extent (e.g. ‘observable history = initial conditions
+ evolution laws’). Yet their epistemic status is often considered to be cate-
gorically different, on the basis of extrapolated theoretical structure. These
issues are discussed further in e.g. Ellis (2014); Smeenk (2014).
To explore these ideas further, let us consider a cosmological model de-
scribed by some global parameters θp (e.g. constants of Nature or initial
conditions). This model also contains a specification of physical laws, which
normally are considered fixed in mathematical form. For the sake of argu-
ment, let us now assume that deviations from these laws can be meaningfully
described by some additional set of parameters δθl. Such a δθl will give rise
to a shift δL(θp, δθl) in the data likelihood for our assumed exhaustive ob-
servations, relative to the same likelihood assuming standard physical laws.
The function δL will in principle depend on the relationship between θp
and δθl in some more general model picture (we have no reason a priori to
exclude such a more general picture). The shift δθl should also affect the
prior Π(θp). While this may not be explicitly stated, a parameter prior for
θp is generically specified conditional on the assumption of certain physical
laws. For the case of global parameters, the distinction between parameters
and laws becomes blurred, as they are both global properties: they may
in fact be co-dependent in an extended or more general picture. However,
the correlation matrix (or other dependence) between θp and δθl cannot be
independently determined from observations, since only one observable re-
alisation of parameter values is available (i.e. our one observable Universe).
Hence, the shift δθl should in general induce a shift Π → Π + δΠ in the
assumed prior, due to the empirically allowed and theoretically plausible de-
pendencies between θp and δθl. On this basis, there will in general be some
function δΠ that should be included for probabilistic completeness. But this
function is essentially unconstrained since it cannot be independently ver-
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ified or falsified. Hence, we are in principle always free to renormalise the
Bayesian evidence by an arbitrary (non-negative) amount without violating
any empirical constraints. Model inference in the conventional sense there-
fore becomes ill defined/meaningless in this context.
The problem here is that while we know that there in general should be
co-dependencies/correlations between laws/parameters, we are unable to ac-
count for them. This means that Kolmogorov’s third axiom (the measure
evaluated on the ‘whole set’ equals the sum of the measures on the disjoint
subsets) is generically violated due to unaccounted-for correlations between
known and unknown global properties (see Kolmogorov, 1933; Jaynes, 2003,
for details on Kolmogorov’s probability theory). The axiom could be re-
garded as unphysical in this context. This may also lead to problems sat-
isfying Kolmogorov’s first (non-negative probabilities) and second axiom
(unitarity) for the prior. While Bayesian probability based on Cox’s theorem
(Cox, 1946, 1961) does not require Kolmogorov’s third axiom (discussed fur-
ther in the following sub-section), potential problems equally arise in relation
to negative probabilities and non-unitarity. Therefore, we find that proba-
bility in this context is better thought of as quasi-probability, occurring also
e.g. in the phase space formulation of quantum mechanics (Wigner, 1932). In
the quantum mechanical case, quasi-probability arises due to Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle. The cosmological case can be regarded as due to an
effective cosmic uncertainty principle, arising from a finite speed of light and
the spatio-temporal localisation of an observer, which fundamentally limit
the observer’s knowledge (McCrea, 1960).
Foundations for Inference
Statistical analysis of empirical measurements is the paradigm within which
inference usually takes place in science, including cosmology. It is therefore
important for us to consider the foundations of probability, as applicable
to this process. A central distinction as regards probability is that between
physical probability and inductive probability. The first is some putative on-
tic probability, the second corresponds to the epistemological evaluation of
empirical data. Albrecht and Phillips (2014) claim that there is no physi-
cally verified classical theory of probability, and that physical probability
rather appears to be a fundamentally quantum phenomenon. They argue
that this undermines the validity of certain questions/statements based on
non-quantum probability and make them ill defined, and that a ‘quantum-
consistent’ approach appears able to provide a resolution of the measure
problem. The precise relationship between physical and inductive probabil-
ity is a long-standing topic of debate, which we will not go into great detail
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on here (for a review, see Jaynes, 2003). The essential point for our discus-
sion is the possible distinction between the two, and the idea that inductive
probability can be calibrated to physical probability through repeated obser-
vations, e.g. in a frequency-of-outcome specification, or a Bayesian posterior
updating process. In that way, credence can be calibrated to empirical evi-
dence.
This procedure fails when considering the Universe as a whole, for which
only one observable realisation exists. A conventional inductive approach to
probability therefore becomes inadequate (unless one assumes that the ob-
servable Universe defines the totality of existence, but this is a rather absurd
and arbitrary notion which inflationary theory also contradicts). This can
also be regarded as a failure to satisfy the second axiom in Kolmogorov’s def-
inition of probability: that there are no elementary events outside the sample
space (Kolmogorov, 1933; Jaynes, 2003). Without a well-defined empirical
calibration of sample space and evidence, one is at risk of circular reasoning
where inductive probability is simply calibrated to itself (and hence, the a
priori assumptions made in the analysis). Related situations in cosmology
have been discussed in the context of the inductive disjunctive fallacy by
Norton (2010).
Bayesian statistics has become the standard approach in cosmology, due
to the limitations of ‘frequentist’ methods when data is scarce in relation
to the tested hypotheses (the whole-Universe and Multiverse cases being
the extreme end of the spectrum). The formalism of Bayesian statistics can
be motivated from rather general assumptions. For example, Cox’s theo-
rem shows that Bayesian statistics is the unique generalisation of Boolean
logic in the presence of uncertainty (Cox, 1946, 1961). This provides a log-
ical foundation for Bayesian statistics. In recent years, it has further been
shown that the Bayesian statistical formalism follows from even more gen-
eral assumptions (the lattice probability construction, see Skilling, 2010;
Knuth and Skilling, 2012), which we will return to in Section 21.5.1.
There is a difference between the definition of probability based on Kol-
mogorov’s three axioms (Kolmogorov, 1933; Jaynes, 2003), and Bayesian
probability based on Cox’s theorem (Cox, 1946, 1961; Van Horn, 2003). Both
constructions are measure-theoretic in nature, but Kolmogorov probability
places a more restrictive requirement on valid measures. In Bayesian prob-
ability, measures are finitely additive, whereas Kolmogorov measures are
countably additive (a subset of finitely additive measures). This means that
in Bayesian probability (based on Cox’s theorem), in principle the measure
evaluated on the full sample space need not equal the sum of the measures
of all disjoint subsets of the sample space. This can be understood to mean
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that integrated regions under such a measure do not represent probabilities
of mutually exclusive states. In the preceding subsection, we discussed this
possibility in the context of unaccounted-for correlations in the structure
of global properties. In the Bayesian statistical set-up, this is thus not a
problem in principle, although problematic negative probabilities and non-
unitarity could also occur in this case.
We can thus see certain benefits with a modern Bayesian statistical frame-
work, relative to the Kolmogorov definition of probability, even though some
issues also present themselves. This leaves, at least, an overall indeterminacy
in ‘total probability’ (through δΠ). More broadly, even if Cox’s theorem or
the lattice probability construction provide mutually consistent logical foun-
dations for Bayesian statistics, it remains an open question what the status
of such logical foundations is. Is there a unique logical foundation? What is
its relation to the physical Universe - is it a physical property? (cf. Putnam,
1969; Dummett, 1976) What is its relation to the Multiverse - is there a uni-
fied logical foundation for the Multiverse? Is cosmic logic and multiversal
inference well-founded? (e.g. Vanchurin, 2016; Sahle´n, 2008, Ch. 4)
Modes of Explanation
In addition to the above, a fundamental question is which phenomena, or
findings otherwise, that are thought to require explanation (on the basis of
current theoretical understanding), and what provides explanation. In the
case of the measure problem, it is often considered that the initial conditions
of the Universe appear to have been very special, i.e. in some sense very
unlikely, and therefore need to be explained (Ellis, 2014; Smeenk, 2014).
This proposition clearly rests on some a priori notion of probable universes,
often based on extrapolations of known physics (e.g. fixed global laws).
The main mode of explanation in cosmology is based on statistical eval-
uation of observational data. This is usually done using the formalism of
Bayesian statistics. The conventional approaches for providing a solution to
the measure problem are also statistical/probabilistic in nature, and can be
regarded as picking some ‘target’ probability regime that is to be reached
for the posterior probability, for a proposed measure to be considered ex-
planatory (another alternative is some strong theoretical/structural moti-
vation). There are broadly speaking two modes of explanation in this vein:
“chance” and “necessity”. For example, the measured values of physical
constants are to be highly probable (fine-tuning/anthropics), average (prin-
ciple of mediocrity), or perhaps necessarily realised at least ‘somewhere’
(string-theory landscape). However, in view of the discussion in the pre-
ceding subsections, it appears impossible to independently establish such
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probabilities, and hence the notions of and distinctions between chance and
necessity become blurred. Statistical explanation therefore suffers from the
same problems as detailed in the preceding sub-sections, with the risk for
circular confirmatory reasoning that is not actually explanatory. This cri-
tique echoes common objections to the epistemic theories of justification
called foundationalism and coherentism. Epistemic justification based on
coherentism can provide support for almost anything through circularity,
and foundationalism can become arbitrary through the assertion of other-
wise unjustified foundational beliefs. Neither of these two epistemological
approaches appear able to provide satisfactory epistemic justification in re-
sponse to the ambiguity in the effective Bayesian prior that we are discussing.
In terms of model structure, the typical form of explanation takes the
shape of evolutionary, universal laws combined with some set of initial con-
ditions at the ‘earliest’ time. Some additional aesthetic/structural criteria
such as simplicity, symmetry, and conserved quantities may also be implicitly
invoked. These are usually introduced as part of the theoretical modelling,
rather than as intrinsically integrated with the inferential procedure. There-
fore, possible co-dependencies with other explanatory criteria (which may
be thought of as a type of global properties!) are usually not considered or
explored.
In conclusion, statistical explanation is ill defined in the context of the
measure problem in Bayesian statistics, and the relation to other possi-
ble explanatory principles typically neglected. How to interpret a Bayesian
evidence value, or differences between such values for different models, is
therefore here not clear.
21.4.3 A Synthesis Proposal
We thus find that the measure problem is ill defined, in principle, in conven-
tional Bayesian statistical inference in the measure problem context. This is
due to a compound ambiguity in the definition of probability, prior specifi-
cation, and evidence interpretation - based on the observations above that
the concepts of
• laws and global parameters / initial conditions
• probability
• explanation
are ambiguous when considering a global, whole-Universe (or Multiverse)
context. Hence, measure problem solution proposals in the Bayesian statis-
tical context ultimately are subjective statements about how ‘strange’ or
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‘reasonable’ one considers the observable Universe to be from some partic-
ular point of view. This suggests that conventional Bayesian model infer-
ence concerning global properties in the circumstances we consider is non-
explanatory, and at best only self-confirmatory. Additional information is
needed to provide meaningful epistemic justification.
The ambiguities listed above can be regarded, in the language of conven-
tional Bayesian inference, as each introducing some effective renormalisation
in the expression for Bayesian evidence. Can these ambiguities be accom-
modated in such a way that inference becomes conceptually well-defined?
There appear to be three possible, consistent, responses to this:
1. Declare model inference meaningless in this context and in the spirit of
Wittgenstein stay silent about it.
2. Introduce additional philosophical/explanatory principles that effectively
restrict the prior (e.g. an anthropic principle, a dynamical or aesthetic
principle on model space).
3. Introduce novel empirical/epistemic domains (e.g. mathematical-structure
space of accepted scientific theory, possibility space of accepted scientific
theory).
This author argues that the natural and consistent approach involves a com-
bination of 2. and 3. To pursue this, we need to explicitly address the am-
biguous concepts and the nature of the ambiguity. The lattice conception
of probability (reviewed in Section 21.5.1), including the measure-theoretic
Bayesian probability as a special case, provides a way to do this. It allows the
generalisation of Bayesian probability and evidence to include more general
valuation functions which can encompass the ambiguity in model structure,
probability and explanation in a consistent way. It also demonstrates that
combining valuation functions is done uniquely by multiplication, suggesting
that the identified ambiguities can be decomposed in such a way.
In conclusion, the measure problem has an irreducible axiological compo-
nent. While there may be some hope of falsifying certain extreme measures,
it should however be clear that any successful resolution would need to ad-
dress this axiological component. The proposed construction constitutes a
natural extension of the Bayesian statistical framework, and can be moti-
vated and naturally implemented starting from the notions of partially or-
dered sets and measure theory. It aims to explicitly include valuations which
are conventionally left implicit, to provide a conceptually and theoretically
consistent framework. The workings of such an axiological Bayesianism will
now be presented.
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21.5 Axiological Bayesianism
21.5.1 Lattice Probability
Kevin H. Knuth and John Skilling have developed a novel approach to the
foundations of Bayesian probability, based on partially-ordered sets and as-
sociated valuations (Knuth and Skilling, 2012). It generalises Kolmogorov’s
and Cox’s earlier work. An overview is given in Skilling (2010), but the main
features will be outlined here. The construction starts off from a general set
of possibilities, for example a set of different models or parameter values,
but where our ultimate purpose is to quantitatively constrain to a sub-set
of inferred preferable possibilities. The set is built up by a ‘null’ element, a
set of basis elements (e.g. {Model A, Model B}), and the set of all combina-
tions of logical disjunctions (‘OR’) between the basis elements (e.g. {Model
A-OR-Model B}).
On this set, partial ordering is defined, denoted here by ‘<’. For elements
x and y, we have that x < y means that y includes x. The ordering is
required to be transitive, i.e.
x < y and y < z =⇒ x < z . (21.3)
The concept of least upper bound is introduced separately. The least upper
bound to x and y, if it exists, is the least element at or including both x
and y. We denote it by x∨ y. The greatest lower bound of x and y is defined
analogously, and denoted x ∧ y.
A lattice is a partially-ordered set with a well-defined least upper bound,
reflecting the idea that the ordering induces a structure on the set. It also
obeys (among other conventional axioms) associativity, (x ∨ y) ∨ z = x ∨
(y ∨ z). This property is central to the probability construction based on
valuations that now follows.
On the lattice, a function prescribing a quantitative valuation to each
lattice element is then introduced. The purpose of this valuation is to rank
elements. Requiring that such a valuation respects the ordering and the
lattice structure, it can be shown that any valuation m must satisfy
m(x ∨ y) = m(x) +m(y) , (21.4)
without loss of generality. This is essentially what defines a mathematical
measure. From this it also follows that the valuation of general lattice ele-
ments (constructed via use of ‘∨’) can be built up by addition from valuation
prescriptions for the basis elements.
One can also consider a direct product ‘×’ of lattices, which under similar
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assumptions on m as above leads to the requirement
m(x× y) = m(x)m(y) (21.5)
on the valuation m. Combinations are thus always multiplicative. This will
be of particular importance in the following.
Turning to the question of how to define probability, it can be shown that
under preservation of lattice structure, associativity, and unitarity, conven-
tional Bayesian probability calculus follows, with a probability p defined
by
p(x|t) ≡
m(x ∧ t)
m(t)
, (21.6)
where t is some lattice context that one considers a priori. This expression
generalises the conventional probability concept and calculus to any valua-
tion concordant with ordering, lattice structure and associativity. It provides
therefore a basis for a generalised inference procedure. A prescription for how
to reason rationally also within the ambiguous context we consider.
21.5.2 Gevidence: Generalisation of Bayesian Evidence
The concept of explanation is intrinsically tied to the concept of proba-
bility in the context of statistical explanation. In generalising the concept
of probability to general valuations (which, as shown above, must also be
mathematical measures in the Knuth–Skilling construction), statistical ex-
planation can therefore in that process also be generalised. Such a general-
isation will involve an evaluation of how well a model corresponds to some
set of explanatory principles encoded in valuations (e.g. predicting empiri-
cal observations, satisfying aesthetic criteria, etc.). We therefore turn to the
question of how Bayesian evidence can be generalised on the basis of the
lattice probability construction, to provide a resolution of the conceptual
problems associated with the measure problem. A key question for imple-
menting a generalisation of Bayesian evidence for model inference, is how
to combine several valuations corresponding to different explanatory crite-
ria and empirical/epistemic domains, into a compound ‘net’ valuation. The
preceding subsection gives the unique answer: by multiplication. Given a set
of valuations/lattice representations, there is thus a unique way to define a
probability based on these, through multiplication.
In analogy with the way in which different physical measurements can be
combined to form joint likelihoods, other explanatory criteria can be com-
bined in different ways using the multiplicative prescription. We therefore
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define a generalised Bayesian evidence – let us call it gevidence for short –
by
P (a, b, c, ...;M) ≡
∫
p(a|θ;M)p(b|θ;M)p(c|θ;M)...Π(θ;M)dθ , (21.7)
where the letters a, b, c, ... refer to different valuation prescriptions corre-
sponding to explanatory criteria. It also useful to define the log-quantity
Labc... ≡ log P (a, b, c, ...;M) , (21.8)
which is more useful when performing model comparison, since the log-
quantities add/subtract between models.
While any valuation measure in itself cannot be ‘proven’, just like for a
parameter prior it can be founded on theoretical principle and experience.
The novel measures are fundamentally no different from conventionally used
priors on model parameter space - they simply generalise to higher orders
of model characteristics. The proposed construction provides a prescription
for how to carry out model comparison on the basis of such measures. It
is not primarily intended as a tool to exclude models, but rather a means
of maintaining a principled and systematic approach to comparing models,
given certain assumptions. Note however that it is possible to perform in-
ference on the explanatory criteria through re-conditionalising, as discussed
in Section 21.5.4.
21.5.3 Evidence, Elegance, Beneficence
While the proposed construction does not remove epistemic ambiguity, it
provides a rational, natural and well-defined framework for examining this
ambiguity in a systematic, rational and explicit way to determine relative
model fitness. A rough way to categorise the possibilities is on the basis of
empirical/epistemic domain. A practical way to classify models is then by
theoretical/mathematical structure and physical possibility space. This can
be translated to correspond to aesthetic and ethical principles. While this
terminology may appear unorthodox, it emphasises the axiological element
which is present regardless, but does not therefore imply the presence of
any aesthetic or moral agent. Model inference thus divides into interlinking
empirical, aesthetic and ethical comparisons. This classification may also be
useful in that it reflects how scientists intuitively tend to approach informal
model assessment. To structure the problem, let us therefore represent the
gevidence in the specific form
P (D,A,E;M) =
∫
L(D|θ;M)p(A|θ;M)p(E|θ;M)Π(θ;M)dθ , (21.9)
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whereD denotes “data”, A denotes “aesthetics”, and E denotes “ethics”. We
thus represent models on a direct product set of empirical observables, model
structure, and model possibility space. Each of these probabilities may in
themselves be subdivided by multiplication into any number of component
valuations.
We may also form the partial gevidences P (A,D;M), P (A,E;M), and
P (D,E;M), which provide additional information about the ways in which
the different explanatory criteria corroborate or contradict each other. We
shall refer to the individual gevidences as evidence [P (D;M)], elegance
[P (A;M)], and beneficence [P (E;M)]. The log-quantities LADE, LAD, LAE ,
LDE , LD, LA, and LE will also be of interest for model comparison.
This quantification offers a formalisation of model comparison and expla-
nation across the categories, and hence also of problem formulation: just as
an unexpectedly rare state in model phase space (fine-tuning) may prompt
explanation, e.g. an unexpectedly un-aesthetic/aesthetic model structure
may prompt explanation.
21.5.4 Implementation and Application
Let us now turn to how, in practice, the type of framework proposed could
be implemented and used. A few essential elements are needed:
• Basis elements for lattice (representation of models);
• Aesthetic measure/s on model-structure space;
• Ethical measure/s on model possibility space;
• Computational capability to evaluate on model-structure space and pos-
sibility space.
Out of these, the first three appear straightforward to achieve. Some aes-
thetic measures of e.g. simplicity are naturally incorporated in the conven-
tional Bayesian statistical framework (Ockham’s razor), others may conven-
tionally be used more informally. The proposed framework formalises model
structure considerations beyond ‘parameter shaving’ with Ockham’s razor.
A list of some possible aesthetic criteria (after Ellis, 2014) are shown in
Table 21.1. As an example, “connectedness to the rest of science” might
be quantified on the basis of the different physical constants that appear
in a model. Ellis and Uzan (2014) argue that Higgs inflation could be re-
garded as a preferred inflation model on such grounds. Ethical measures
are not commonly discussed, although scientists (as everyone) will at some
level be influenced by such considerations, for example due to their philo-
sophical position along the axis from materialism to idealism (ethics defined
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Table 21.1 Example aesthetic model comparison criteria, after Ellis (2014).
Satisfactory structure
(a) internal consistency, (b) simplicity (Ockham’s razor),
(c) ‘beauty’ or ‘elegance’;
Intrinsic explanatory power
(a) logical tightness,
(b) scope of the theory - unifying otherwise separate phenomena;
Extrinsic explanatory power
(a) connectedness to the rest of science,
(b) extendability - a basis for further development.
on exclusively materialistic or idealistic grounds can clearly differ signifi-
cantly). Explicit consideration of ethics in relation to cosmology is given
by Knobe et al. (2006), who discuss the ethical implications of inflationary
cosmology, and in Murphy and Ellis (1996) where it is argued that scien-
tific cosmology points toward a kenotic ethic. Computational capability on
model-structure space should be reasonably adequate with today’s technol-
ogy. However, computations of/on possibility spaces may present serious
challenges especially for complex theories and measures.
In practice, the framework can be used much the way models are com-
pared in the light of different data sets both separately and jointly to test
consistency and combined inferential power. Fig. 21.1 shows schematically a
simple way to illustrate the evidence P (D;M), elegance P (A;M) and benef-
icence P (E;M). A fuller representation is shown schematically in Fig. 21.2,
where the log-gevidences are shown for all possible combinations of criteria.
This figure gives a complete picture of the model gevidence, and can be
directly compared between models to understand which model is best over-
all, or with respect to combinations of only some of the criteria. This offers
possibilities to explore multi-factor explanations, i.e. part empirical, part
aesthetic, part ethical. It gives a clear picture of to what extent empirical
data and axiological criteria are consistent with each other.
One may also examine which aesthetic and ethical criteria are ‘preferred’
with the help of the framework. By re-conditionalising the probability, one
can compute e.g. P (D|A;M) = P (D,A;M)/P (A;M) which quantifies the
empirical support for the elegance principle A (under model M). One could
also separately study the support for particular explanatory criteria across
some range of models of relevance by comparing P (C) = ΣMP (C;M)Π(M)
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Figure 21.1 A schematic axiological Bayesian triangle representation of
model evidence P (D;M), elegance P (A;M), and beneficence P (E;M).
for different criteria C, which thus effectively extends the empirical/epistemic
domain to model structure and model possibility space.
21.6 Concluding Discussion
In this Chapter, it has been argued – in concordance with earlier observations
by Ellis (2014), Smeenk (2014), and others – that
1. Model inference in cosmology involves both evaluation of empirical sta-
tistical evidence and application of other interpretative principles.
2. The Bayesian statistical framework, particularly, suffers from the mea-
sure problem in relation to explanation of global properties in a whole-
Universe and Multiverse context (notably, inflationary initial conditions).
3. Some interpretative principles are not in themselves empirically testable
by conventional Bayesian statistical tests,
4. Bayesian statistical explanation therefore is effectively qualitative in the
whole-Universe context, such that Bayesian probability becomes ambigu-
ous quasi-probability and the measure problem ill defined.
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Figure 21.2 A schematic axiological Bayesian circle representation of model
gevidence, useful for model comparison. The implicit model conditioning
has been dropped in the figure. The figure is divided into a positive and
negative half-plane. There are three axes on which are crosses to indicate
the values of LD, LA and LE . These axes and the axis separating the half-
planes divide the figure into eight equal segments. Within these are plotted
shaded circle segments with areas corresponding the values of LAD, LDE,
LAE and LADE. The shaded circle segments are placed in the segment
delineated by the axes corresponding to the two criteria in question, e.g.
LAD is placed between the axes for LD and LA. In the case of AE, the
half-plane axis forms one of the axes. LADE is plotted in the remaining
section. Positive values are indicated by placing the shaded circle segment
in the positive half-plane, and negative values in the negative half-plane.
This is reinforced by choosing the orientation of the shading lines to dis-
tinguish positive and negative values. The areas can be directly compared
within figures for a given model, and between figures for different mod-
els, to indicate relative model fitness (a model difference figure can also be
constructed in the same way). Recall that the larger the values are, the
stronger the support is for a model.
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5. It is possible to extend Bayesian statistical inference in a natural and
unique way to explicitly account for non-observational explanatory prin-
ciples and provide a conceptually well-defined inferential procedure.
These considerations lead to the following conclusion. If we accept proba-
bility calculus as founded on the lattice construction, then the conventional
scientific method can be regarded as a special case of a more general part-
subjective, but uniquely rational, framework for reasoning we have termed
“axiological Bayesianism”. This framework generalises Bayesian statistics to
define a more general version of Bayesian evidence for model inference. We
have called this “gevidence” and divided it into three main sub-components:
evidence, elegance, and beneficence. This enables the inclusion of probabili-
ties based on valuation measures on model structure and possibility space,
that combine in a unique way. The framework appears to have overlap
with Dawid’s concept of non-empirical theory evaluation (Dawid, 2013),
and to lend itself to the epistemic theory of justification called foundher-
entism (Haack, 1993), a synthesis of foundationalism and coherentism. The
framework can be further justified by appealing to epistemological princi-
ples of uniformity/unity and consistency/coherence to be extended to new
domains, i.e. model inference and comparison.
Potential problems with the proposed inference approach arise if the rules
of probability are themselves global empirical properties of the Universe,
just like a physical law, since such a ‘probability law’ could be different
in other parts of a multiverse. The quasi-probability nature of Bayesian
statistics in our analysis, and the lattice construction foundation, suggests
that the framework may be extended to consider alternative logical foun-
dations for probability, e.g. quantum logic (Svozil, 1998), intuitionistic logic
(Weatherson, 2003), fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1978). It remains to be seen how
the framework of axiological Bayesianism might be developed and applied
in practice. The details of model representation, associated product-space
construction and measures, as well as computational techniques, need to be
worked out. A reference scale for gevidence differences would be desirable
(perhaps based on the concept of information, see Skilling, 2010).
When there are very limited data, it is inevitable in principle that some
type of hermeneutic process comes into play when engaging in inference.
We must then either accept additional explanatory criteria (i.e. not based
on data likelihood) as valid ‘scientific method’, or appeal to some additional
principle that invalidates such criteria. One possible such principle might be
that the type of subjectivity inherent in axiological Bayesianism is outside
the realms of science, and hence the framework is to be rejected. This is a
On Probability and Cosmology: Inference Beyond Data? 21
perfectly valid position. However, since it was shown above that subjective
ambiguity is also present implicitly in the conventional Bayesian framework,
this principle also excludes making statements about the measure problem
using that same framework. One should then choose to stay silent on the
matter, to remain consistent. Hence, the proposed framework appears to be
an in principle necessary, conceptually consistent, and theoretically natural
(though not necessarily unique) generalisation of the Bayesian statistical
framework for addressing the measure problem and similar questions, for
those who wish not to stay silent.
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